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I am immensely grateful to William Outhwaite for commenting on my book The ‘Postmodern
Turn’ in the Social Sciences (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).1 I should stress at the
outset that I agree with most of the points he makes in his commentary, which I find very
insightful, thought-provoking, and constructive. Hence, any reader expecting to be entertained
by a cockfight between book author and book reviewer will be disappointed. Let me take this
opportunity to reflect on some of the main issues raised in Outhwaite’s inspiring review.
“Definitive”
I am not sure whether or not I have “produced what is surely the definitive account of postmodern
social, political, and cultural theory”2, but it seems to me that Outhwaite is certainly right to point
out that most contemporary social scientists would agree with the contention that the postmodern
era—if there has ever been such a thing—is “well and truly over”3. Onemay, or may not, share the
view that the sustained concern with, and the heated debates on, the concept of “the postmodern”
peaked in the mid-1990s4, as I maintain in the book, and that “around 1997 or so the tide started to
turn”5, as asserted by Keith Tester in an interview he conducted with Zygmunt Bauman.6
Irrespective of the question of what one makes of this assessment, however, there is no point in
denying that today, in the early twenty-first century, the concept of “the postmodern” is out of
fashion, regarded bymost social scientists as, at best, an outdated object of investigation belonging
Int J Polit Cult Soc (2016) 29:429–438
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1Susen (2015).
2Outhwaite (2016/2017) (italics added).
3Ibid.
4On this point, see Susen (2015), pp. 32 and 75.
5Bauman and Tester (2007), p. 25.
6See ibid.
* Simon Susen
Simon.Susen@city.ac.uk
1 City University London, Northampton Square, London EC1V 0HB, UK
to the history of intellectual thought or, at worst, an esoteric subject of inquiry that never deserved
to be taken seriously in the first place. I hope to have demonstrated in my book that the various
paradigmatic transitions that have arguably been taking place in the social sciences over the past
few decades should be reason enough to grapple with the numerous theoretical and practical
implications of the “postmodern turn”. If there is anything “definitive” about this study, it is the
conclusion that the “postmodern spirit”, notably in terms of its subtle spheres of influence, will be
around for some time to come, even if the historical episode associated with it may long be over.
“Paradoxical”
In my view, Outhwaite is right to draw attention to the paradoxical nature of historical periodiza-
tions concerning the purported advent of “the postmodern”. More specifically, Lyotard’s claim7—to
which Outhwaite refers in his commentary—that “the postmodern” can be interpreted not only as
“the successor to the modern”8 but also, in a more fundamental sense, as “a precursor to it”9 is
sociologically significant, implying that key features of the “postmodern condition” have always
already been part of both modern and premodern life forms. In other words, even if post-traditional
modes of existence associated with postmodernity are characterized by a radicalization of indeter-
minacy at unparalleled levels, this does not mean that indeterminacy cannot be regarded as a
constitutive component of human modes of existence preceding those of the present.
As Outhwaite—citing Adorno—suggests, it may appear that the modern “lives on because the
moment to realize it was missed”10—an insight that Adorno applied to the interpretation of the role
of philosophy in the twentieth century. Yet, whereas sceptics may posit that, as Adorno notes,
“philosophy […] once seemed obsolete”11, even the most extreme advocates of postmodernity
would find it difficult to provide conclusive evidence for the validity of the contention that
modernity has completely disappeared from the historical stage. To the extent that modernity
remains an “unfinished project”12, it continues to represent a societal condition of unfulfilled
potential. This potential, however, constitutes a conglomerate of contradictory—that is, of both
positive and negative, empowering and disempowering, emancipatory and repressive—forces. The
paradox persists.
“Independent”/“Interdependent”
As Outhwaite rightly remarks, my book aims to examine the impact of the “postmodern turn” on
the social sciences by disaggregating it into five paradigmatic transitions, which are characterized
by the recognition of, and insistence upon, “the radical indeterminacy of all material and symbolic
forms of existence”13: the “relativist turn” in epistemology, the “interpretive turn” in social
7 On this point, see Lyotard (1986).
8 Outhwaite (2016/2017) (italics added).
9 Ibid. (italics added).
10 Adorno (1973 [1966]), p. 3.
11 Ibid., p. 3.
12 See Habermas (1996 [1981]) and Habermas (1989 [1985/1987]). On modernity as an unfinished project, see
also, for example: Frank (1992); Honneth et al. (1992a); Honneth et al. (1992b); McLellan (1992); Outhwaite
(2009 [1994]), pp. 118–133; Outhwaite (1996), esp. pp. 305–365; Passerin d’Entrèves and Benhabib (1996);
Patton (2001), esp. p. 11875; Susen (2007), p. 72; and Susen (2015), pp. 233–235, 241, and 279.
13 Susen (2015), p. 1 (italics in original); on this formulation, see also ibid., pp. 39, 233, 258, and 278. In addition,
see Outhwaite (2016/2017).
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research methodology, the “cultural turn” in sociology, the “contingent turn” in historiography,
and the “autonomous turn” in politics. These presuppositional shifts are, at the same time,
relatively independent and relatively interdependent.
& They are relatively independent, insofar as each of them has its own rationale, expressed in
idiosyncratic disciplinary implications and consequences.
& They are relatively interdependent, insofar as they draw upon, and are influenced by, one
another, while sharing “what Wittgenstein would have called a family resemblance”14.
As argued in my book, one crucial trait that these paradigmatic turns have in common is
their sustained concern with different degrees and forms of indeterminacy. One may have good
reason to object to—or, instead, to sympathize with—(i) relativist conceptions of knowledge,
(ii) interpretivist conceptions of social research, (iii) culturalist conceptions of society, (iv)
non-determinist conceptions of history, and (v) autonomist conceptions of politics. Notwith-
standing the respective merits and limitations of these paradigmatic positions, they have had,
and continue to have, a major impact upon the normative parameters underlying large parts of
both mainstream and alternative forms of investigation in the contemporary social sciences. As
Outhwaite eloquently puts it, “the ‘postmodern turn’ has had the valuable consequence that it
has sharpened our focus on a number of important features of the recent developments shaping
modern societies”15, including the ways in which they are conceptualized by laypersons in
their everyday lives as well as by social-scientific experts in their critical explorations.
“Indeterminate”
One of the ironies of the term indeterminacy is that, as Outhwaite perceptively observes, its
meaning is itself indeterminate, or at least ambiguous. Its denotative and connotative meanings
range “from ‘vagueness’ or ‘imprecision’ to stronger and sometimes more formal notions of
‘undecidability’”16. In my opinion, Outhwaite’s (hitherto) preference for the term fragmenta-
tion as “a common denominator to these postmodern turns”17 is entirely justified, not least
because—along with “indeterminacy”—it represents one of the most striking characteristics of
highly complex human life forms. Unsurprisingly, different commentators have different views
about the usefulness of epochal labels—such as “modern”, “late modern”, or “postmodern”—
aimed at capturing the historical specificity of the current era. Irrespective of one’s assessment
of these descriptions, it is no accident that fragmentation constitutes one of the predominant
tendencies examined, and frequently bemoaned, by contemporary critical sociologists. Indeed,
the increasing fragmentation of key civilizational—notably social, cultural, political, econom-
ic, geographic, demographic, epistemic, and experiential—dimensions of human life forms
appears to contribute to the gradual disintegration of elements that play a pivotal role in the
flourishing of the human condition.18
Some readers will agree, and others will disagree, with Outhwaite’s verdict that the term
indeterminacy is “probably the best way of representing a common denominator to these
14 Outhwaite (2016/2017) (italics removed from “family resemblance”).
15 Ibid. (italics added).
16 Ibid. In this context, Outhwaite makes reference to Gödel (1931).
17 Outhwaite (2016/2017).
18 Outhwaite mentions the fragmentation of work and of family relations as two examples. See ibid.
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postmodern turns—better, perhaps, than the notion of ‘fragmentation’, which [he has tended]
to use to explain them”19. One may add to this judgement that, paradoxically, fragmentation
processes are as much about determinacy as they are about indeterminacy. In terms of
determinacy, fragmentation processes may follow causally defined and relatively predictable
patterns of development, in accordance with context-specific logics of social functioning. In
terms of indeterminacy, fragmentation processes may constitute fairly open and rather unpre-
dictable dynamics, emerging from—while also triggering—unintended consequences. The
challenge of living with different degrees and forms of determinacy and indeterminacy lies
at the core of our everyday lives.
“Ambivalent”
Undoubtedly, it is difficult to make sense of modernity without accounting for the extent to
which it is marked by different levels of ambivalence.20 On the one hand, there is a dark
modernity, whose repressive facets cannot be dissociated from the socio-historical preponder-
ance of instrumental reason. On the other hand, there is a bright modernity, whose emanci-
patory aspects have been brought about, as well as grasped, by the discursive force of critical
reason. The former “are intimately associated with variations of control—such as power,
authority, order, discipline, obedience, enclosure, and heteronomy—and materialize them-
selves in social processes of domination, regulation, exploitation, alienation, fragmentation,
exclusion, and discrimination”21. The latter “are expressed in Enlightenment ideals—such as
progress, tolerance, liberty, equality, solidarity, dignity, sovereignty, and autonomy—and
manifest themselves in social processes of liberation, self-determination, and unification”22.
Outhwaite and I seem to agree on the sociological centrality of this ambivalence. As noted by
Outhwaite, the conceptual antithesis of “liberty” and “discipline”23 captures this duality in an
analytically powerful manner, obliging us to resist any temptation to reduce modernity either to its
empowering or to its disempowering dimensions.24 In fact, the overly pessimistic narrative that
converts the whole of modernity into “a caricature of totalizing reason”25, portraying it as a
completely or at least “tendentially totalitarian”26 era, is as problematic as the excessively
optimistic narrative that presents the whole of modernity as an emancipatory expression of the
Kantian trinity of Verstand, Vernunft, and Urteilskraft, giving the misleading impression that it is
tantamount to a pristine condition of universal enlightenment. Both the spirit and the reality of
modernity have illustrated, time and again, that it is by recognizing the tension-laden confluence,
rather than the artificial separation, of the bright and the dark sides of contemporary history that
19 Ibid.
20 On this point, see Susen (2015), pp. 16–18. See also ibid., pp. 1, 16–22, 44, 75, 113, 119, 143, 174, 178, 179,
180, 190, 191, 204, 205, 219, 223, 235, 236, 269, 273, 276, 279, and 285n86. On the social and political
challenges arising from the experience of ambivalence under modern and/or postmodern conditions, see, for
instance: Bauman (1991); Bauman and Tester (2007), esp. pp. 23–25 and 29; Hammond (2011), pp. 305, 310,
312, and 315; Iggers (2005 [1997]), pp. 146–147; Jacobsen and Marshman (2008), pp. 804–807; Kellner (2007),
p. 117; Mulinari and Sandell (2009), p. 495; Quicke (1999), p. 281; Susen (2010), esp. pp. 62–78; and van Raaij
(1993), esp. pp. 543–546, 551–555, and 559–561.
21 Susen (2015), p. 17.
22 Ibid., p. 17.
23 See Wagner (1994).
24 On this point, see Adorno and Horkheimer (1997 [1944/1969]).
25 Outhwaite (2016/2017).
26 Ibid.
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critical theory can contribute to a balanced—and, hence, plausible—understanding of the contra-
dictory forces that have shaped, and continue to shape, human lifeworlds in communicatively
sustained, yet systemically colonized, interactional formations.
“Transcendental”/“Open-Ended”
Making reference to Jack Nusan Porter’s attempt to respond to the question of whether or not
sociology is “dead”27, Outhwaite examines the cogency of the following twofold answer to
this interrogation:
& If understood as a grand theory, or a set of catch-all explanatory frameworks with
ambitious macro-conceptual pretensions, the answer is yes.
& If understood as an open-ended impulse to develop a critical understanding of different
aspects of human society, comprising the ways in which our understanding of it is
constantly being redefined, the answer is no.
Outhwaite has argued elsewhere28, and reiterated in his review ofmy book29, that most of social
theory is closer to the latter position than to the former. He makes it clear that, as a result, he has
serious doubts about the validity of my claim that, in recent decades, we have been witnessing a
“crisis of the universalist ambitions of modern social theory”30, which “is inextricably linked to the
advent of the ‘postmodern turn’ in the contemporary social sciences”31. In other words, if it is true
that most—including most prominent—social theorists have always conceived of their project as a
critical endeavour, irreducible to the attempt to provide simplistic big-picture accounts of highly
complex realities, then it is misleading tomake provocative announcements about the alleged crisis
of the ostensibly universalist spirit running through the construction of sociological toolkits.
Outhwaite, in support of this assertion, draws attention to founding figures of sociology (that is,
Marx, Durkheim, Weber, and Simmel), all of whom—in his view—succeeded in “offering the
social-scientific equivalent of transcendental arguments in philosophy: open-ended attempts to
explain how some manifest phenomenon […] is possible”32.
The question that poses itself in this context, however, is to what extent it is possible to
reconcile “the transcendental” and “the open-ended” without falling into the trap of a merely
rhetorical commitment to recognizing two key aspects of social life:
& on the one hand, the species-constitutive presence, and socio-ontological significance, of
foundational—and, hence, cross-culturally valid—elements of human existence, whose an-
thropological centrality transcends the spatiotemporal boundaries of civilizational specificity;
& on the other hand, the species-constitutive presence, and socio-ontological significance, of
contextual—and, thus, culturally contingent—elements of human existence, whose an-
thropological centrality depends on the spatiotemporal boundaries of civilizational
specificity.
27 See Porter (2008), p. viii. On this issue, see also Susen (2015), p. 6.
28 See Outhwaite (1999).
29 See Outhwaite (2016/2017).
30 Susen (2015), p. 6.
31 Ibid., p. 6.
32 Outhwaite (2016/2017) (italics in original) (spelling modified).
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Social theorists—and, in a broader sense, social philosophers—have grappled with this
tension for a long time; it is far from obvious, however, to what degree this tension can, or even
should, be resolved. It seems to me that the paradigmatic transition from the (arguably modern)
preoccupation with relative determinacy33 to the (arguably postmodern) concern with radical
indeterminacy34 has shifted the investigative parameters from the search for foundational and
cross-culturally valid to the exposure of contextual and culturally contingent elements of
human existence.
Surely, most—if not, all—constitutive social phenomena are characterized by both the
former and the latter. As I have sought to demonstrate in another book35, all human life forms
are crucially shaped by at least five socio-ontological foundations: labour, language, culture,
desire, and experience.36 In terms of their role and constitution, however, these socio-
ontological foundations vary substantially across time and space, acquiring different functions,
and reaching different levels of development, in different modes of existence. In brief, both
“the foundational” and “the contingent” are built into the human condition. Social life is
marked, and shaped, by both the contingency of foundations and the foundations of contin-
gency. It is the task of sociological research to explore the relationship between the founda-
tional and the contextual elements of human existence. Given that this relationship is shot
through with—to use Outhwaite’s terminology—both transcendental and open-ended pro-
cesses and structures, this task cannot be dissociated from the challenge of shedding light on
the relationship between determinacy and indeterminacy.37
“Critical Realist”
The thematic overlap between postmodern thought and other perspectives may not always be
immediately obvious. One central area of investigation in which the intersection between
postmodern and alternative variants of social analysis is evident, however, is epistemology. In
line with this insight, Outhwaite makes reference to Roy Bhaskar’s critical realism38, which
urges us to concede that “reality, even to a considerable extent social reality, is as it is,
independent of our descriptions”39, while insisting that “we can know it only under particular
descriptions and that these are inevitably changing, open-ended, and contentious”40. If we
accept this twofold presuppositional framework by subscribing to both realism (“reality does
exist”) and criticism (“we need to be critical of our material and symbolic constructions of
reality”), then—as Outhwaite reminds us—“we have gone a long way to meeting the claims of
postmodernism”41, notably its advocacy of epistemological scepticism, which, in this case, is
conceptually embedded in a radicalized version of social constructivism. Rather than
33 On this point, see Susen (2015), pp. 1, 39, 48, 65, 72, 74, 92, 233, 258, 265, and 278.
34 On this point, see ibid., pp. 1, 9, 19, 39, 48, 59, 65, 66, 69, 72, 74, 82, 90, 92, 93, 104, 137, 138, 139, 166, 180,
233, 258, 264, 265, 268, and 278.
35 Susen (2007).
36 On this point, see ibid., Chapter 10.
37 On this point, see Susen (2015), pp. 1, 9, 19, 39, 48, 59, 65, 66, 69, 72, 74, 82, 90, 92, 93, 104, 137, 138, 139,
166, 180, 233, 258, 264, 265, 268, and 278.
38 See, for instance: Archer et al. (1998); Bhaskar (2011a [1989]); Bhaskar (2011b [2002]); and Bhaskar (2012
[2002]).
39 Outhwaite (2016/2017) (italics in original).
40 Ibid. (italics added).
41 Ibid.
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stubbornly demonizing or naïvely embracing postmodern thought, we need to acknowledge
that it may be both theoretically and practically fruitful to identify its main intellectual
contributions to the contemporary social sciences, including areas of inquiry that have been
sources of intense dispute for centuries.
“Narrative”
According to Outhwaite, the principal achievement of my book is “to document, with
meticulous accuracy and precision, the vast variety of ways in which social theory has
responded to these changes”42—that is, to profound transformations associated with
unprecedented degrees of indeterminacy and fragmentation—“in the course of the to-
and-fro over ‘the postmodern’”43. In such a climate, “political ideologies are boiled
down into sound-bites and flavours”44, dispersed within a rainbow-like assemblage of
competing narratives, none of which can claim to possess a discursive monopoly on the
interpretation of reality. In the contemporary era, highly differentiated societies lack a
processual, let alone a structural, epicentre. Outhwaite posits, with a healthy dose of
irony, that “[w]e are, in a sense, all populists now”45. In the jungle world of commodified
eclecticism, we are able to choose from a large variety of lifestyle-related options and
diffusely organized worldviews. In such a polycentric—or, if one prefers, centreless—
environment of ubiquitous plurality, all narratives—regardless of whether they may be
classified as “micro” or “macro”, “minor” or “major”, “mini” or “maxi”, “contingent” or
“foundational”—compete in an open market of the “anything-goes-world”46.
“Fishy”
Outhwaite’s most significant—and, in my view, at least partly justified—criticism “is that
in casting [my] trawling net so broadly (including—rather problematically—Nietzsche,
Heidegger, and Wittgenstein), [I tend] to occlude the role of some of the bigger explicitly
postmodernist and/or poststructuralist fish (including, perhaps, Stanley Fish)”47. Al-
though, in Outhwaite’s eyes, Jean-François Lyotard and Jean Baudrillard receive the
attention they deserve, other “high flyers” whose names are rightly or wrongly associated
with la vague postmoderne—such as Bruno Latour, Michel Maffesoli, Gianni Vattimo,
Judith Butler, and Fredric Jameson—do not figure as “first-league game changers” and
are largely relegated to footnotes. Let me, in response to this observation, make two
straightforward points.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid. (spelling modified).
45 Ibid.
46 Susen (2015), p. 32. On this point, see also ibid., pp. 117, 193, 194, 211, 252, 280, and 286n134. On the
slogan “anything goes”, see, for instance: Beck and Lau (2005), pp. 540–554; Boghossian (2006), p. 23; Butler
(2002), pp. 35; Clicqué (2005), esp. p. 29; Cole (2003), p. 493; Eickelpasch (1997), pp. 18–19; Elliott (2007
[2001]), p. 141; Gane and Gane (2007), p. 131; Matthewman and Hoey (2006), p. 536; Mcevoy (2007), p. 399;
Nola and Irzik (2003), p. 395; Rose (1991), pp. 3 and 60; Sokal and Bricmont (1998), pp. 78–85; Torfing (1999),
pp. 275–276; and van Raaij (1993), p. 560.
47 Outhwaite (2016/2017) (italics added).
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First, as spelled out in the section entitled “AMethodological Problem”48, “[t]he theoretical
exploration of the ‘postmodern turn’ undertaken in this book is based on a thematic, rather than
an author-focused, examination”49. To be exact, my study has sought to offer an “aspect-
oriented account of postmodern thought”50 by focusing on five areas of concern: epistemol-
ogy, methodology, sociology, historiography, and politics. Drawing attention to both the
advantages and the disadvantages of such a—thematically guided—form of inquiry, the book
contains a somewhat self-critical section, which comprises the following explanation:
Paradoxically, the main strength of an aspect-oriented analysis is, at the same time, its
major weakness. Its strength lies in its capacity to illustrate the thematic complexity of
the “postmodern turn”. Itsweakness, however, consists in its tendency to over-generalize.
It is human beings—that is, individual thinkers, authors, and researchers—who stand
behind the issues discussed in a thematically organized volume. Hence, to structure the
argument in accordance with the five aforementioned areas of concern and, furthermore,
take them to represent the most striking features of an overall paradigmatic shift means to
impose a sense of consistency and homogeneity on a remarkably amorphous and
heterogeneous landscape of paradigmatic transitions and contradictions. In other words,
the risk of making overgeneralizations, resulting from the attempt to provide a themat-
ically structured overview of an internally diversified and fragmented intellectual move-
ment, constitutes a serious—albeit not untenable—methodological limitation of the
foregoing enquiry.51
The paragraph cited above is not meant to serve as an excuse for what harsh critics may
conceive of as an indefensible inadequacy. It makes clear, however, that the aspect-oriented,
rather than author-focused, analytical undertaking of my book does not aim to offer a detailed
discussion of original contributions made by individual scholars to postmodern thought. To put
it bluntly, the study seeks to accomplish what it says on the tin: namely, to provide an in-depth
aspect-oriented—and, thus, thematically structured—investigation into the impact of the
“postmodern turn” on the contemporary social sciences.
Second, the section entitled “Who are These “Postmodernists?”52 provides a detailed
account of a “list of scholars whose works are—directly or indirectly, explicitly or implicitly,
rightly or wrongly—associated with the rise of postmodern thought”53. With the exception of
Stanley E. Fish, all of the thinkers mentioned by Outhwaite in this context are not only
included in this section but also examined and classified in terms of their importance for a
comprehensive understanding of the “postmodern turn”. Of course, one may have good reason
to disagree with the book’s assessment of their respective significance, especially in relation to
point number 12, which categorizes these thinkers in terms of their intellectual influence
(dividing them into three categories: “highly influential”, “very influential”, and “influen-
tial”).54 With the exception of Vattimo, all of the intellectuals mentioned by Outhwaite are
classified as “very influential” (and “very prominent contemporary scholars”), and their works
are extensively referred to throughout the book. Hence, although it is true that, in this study, the
48 See Susen (2015), p. 232.
49 Ibid., p. 232 (italics in original).
50 Ibid., p. 232 (italics added).
51 Ibid., p. 232 (italics in original).
52 See ibid., pp. 22–31.
53 Ibid., p. 22.
54 On this point, see ibid., p. 31.
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Anglo-American literary theorist Stanley E. Fish is relegated to a footnote55, I am not sure to
what extent it is accurate to affirm that I “occlude”56 the vital role played by the other
aforementioned thinkers in the postmodern endeavour.
More importantly, however, Outhwaite is, I believe, right to suggest that my book—while
drawing attention to the fact that “most of the relevant thinkers are French or, secondarily, North
American”57—“does not […] say much about the underlying dynamics”58 that may explain this
ethnocentric constitution of postmodern scholarship. Indeed, similar to poststructuralism, postmod-
ernism “was a largely French product but onewhichwasmore successful in its export version than at
home”59—that is, one that was highly popular in Anglophone circles, but of marginal importance in
the discursive domain of their Francophone counterparts, which had generatedmost of the “celebrity
chefs”60 responsible for the postmodern menu. Perhaps, then, another book needs to be written to
shed light on the socio-historical conditions underpinning the production of postmodern thought in
different parts of the world. Certainly, this would be an ambitious task, but one worth pursuing.
Une fin sans fin…
William Outhwaite has done a brilliant job in providing a remarkably balanced and generous
account of a book that, I am sure, suffers from various significant limitations and shortcom-
ings, not least due to its ambitious nature. As, I hope, my study has demonstrated on several
levels, the key facets of the “postmodern turn” are of paramount importance to the contem-
porary social sciences and will continue to shape their development in the future.
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